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Abstract 
Just as it had in several recent similar disputes, the Panel in China – Autos found several of the 
challenged issues WTO inconsistent. We believe virtually all of the deficiencies noted by the Panel 
could be easily addressed with minor changes to MOFCOM practices. The real significance of this 
dispute lies in what it tell us about the larger trade policy dance between the US and China. On the one 
hand, with the series of related WTO disputes the US has demonstrated that China must comply with 
WTO rules. The more vexing challenge, however, is the apparent tit-for-tat motivation for this and 
other recent Chinese trade policies, and on this point this dispute does little to change the calculus. The 
prospective nature of WTO relief makes it almost impossible for the WTO to discourage the type of 
opportunistic protectionist actions exemplified by this case. 
Keywords 
MOFCOM, essential facts, price effects, tit-for-tat protection. 
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I. Introduction 
In China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Automobiles from the United States 
(China – Autos (US)),1 the United States challenged China’s imposition of anti-dumping (AD) and 
countervailing (CVD) duty measures on certain automobiles from the United States, as set out in 
Notices 20 and 84 of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM).2 The 
Panel found that several procedural and substantive aspects of the investigations leading to the 
imposition of the measures were inconsistent with the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). Under these two agreements, a WTO 
Member may not impose AD or CVD measures unless its relevant authorities conduct an investigation 
that determines the existence of dumping or subsidization respectively as well as consequential injury 
to the domestic industry. 
Regarding the procedural aspects of the investigations, the Panel found that China had acted 
inconsistently with Article 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) and Article 12.4.1 of the 
SCM Agreement because it failed to require interested parties providing confidential information for 
the investigations to furnish adequate non-confidential summaries of that information, that is, 
summaries detailed enough to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information. 
The Panel also found that China acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 of the ADA, which requires the 
authorities to inform interested parties, before making a final determination, ‘of the essential facts 
under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures’. 
However, the Panel found that China had not acted inconsistently with provisions of the ADA and the 
SCM Agreement regarding disclosure of essential facts and public notice in connection with 
MOFCOM’s determination of the residual AD/CVD rates for unknown US exporters. 
As for the substantive analysis in the investigations, the Panel found that China had acted 
inconsistently with Article 6.8 and Annex II para 1 of the ADA and Article 12.7 of the SCM 
Agreement in determining the residual AD/CVD rates for unknown US exporters. The Panel also 
found that China had acted inconsistently with: Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the ADA and Articles 15.1 and 
15.2 of the SCM Agreement in the analysis of price effects; and Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA and 
Articles 15.1 and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement in the analysis of causation. The Panel also made a 
finding of consequential violation of the overarching obligations in Article 1 of the ADA and 
Article 10 of the SCM Agreement. Finally, the Panel found that China had not acted inconsistently 
with Article 3.1 or 4.1 of the ADA or Article 15.1 or 15.6 of the SCM Agreement in defining the 
domestic industry. 
Many of the US claims were similar to those raised by the US in several previous WTO dispute 
brought by the US against China: China – GOES,3 and China – X-Ray Equipment,4 and in China – 
Broiler Products.
5
 As a result, to the extent that the issues have already been analyzed in previous ALI 
                                                     
1
 Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Automobiles from the United States (China – 
Autos (US)), WT/DS440/R (23 May 2014). 
2
 MOFCOM, Announcement No. 20 and Appendix, “Final Determination of the People’s Republic of China concerning the 
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Investigation on Imports of Certain Automobiles Originating in the United States” (5 
May 2011); MOFCOM, Announcement No. 84 (14 December 2011).  
3
 Appellate Body Report, China – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel 
from the United States (China – GOES), WT/DS414/AB/R, adopted 16 November 2012. 
4
 Panel Report, China – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from the European 
Union (China –X-Ray Equipment), WT/DS425/R and Add.1, 26 February 2013. 
5
 Panel Report, China – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States 
(China – Broiler Products), WT/DS427/R, 2 August 2013. 
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reports
 
(Prusa and Vermulst, 2014, 2015; Moore and Wu, 2015) we will not analyze them in this 
report again, although we elaborate on the overlap in issues in section 3. We review some of the 
procedural shortcomings of the MOFCOM investigation in section 4 and discuss substantive issues 
related to MOFCOM’s determination of injury in section 5. Section 6 will offer several perspectives 
on the reasons why have observed multiple cases involving China’s recurring issues with causality and 
price effects. Finally, we conclude in section 7 with a few comments on the political economy 
dimensions of this dispute and the specter of WTO consistent tit-for-tat trade disputes. 
II. Adoption and Implementation of the Panel’s Adverse Ruling 
The Panel issued its interim report to the parties on 21 February 2014 to allow comments from the 
parties pursuant to Article 15.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU). During the interim review process, China advised the Panel that the 
measures at issue had been repealed on 15 December 2013 and therefore contended that the Panel had 
no basis for making recommendations under Article 19.1 of the DSU. 
The Panel agreed with the United States that China had not provided evidence demonstrating the 
repeal of the relevant measures
6
 and therefore included in its report a recommendation ‘that China 
bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping and SCM 
Agreements’ (para 8.3).  
On 18 June 2014, in the absence of an appeal of the Panel Report by either party, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Panel Report in China – Autos (US). At that meeting of the DSB, 
China again stated that it had terminated the relevant measures on 15 December 2013, as announced 
by MOFCOM on that date.
7
 The United States welcomed this development and acknowledged that ‘it 
would appear that no more action was necessary for China in respect of the findings and 
recommendations in the Panel Report’ but nevertheless urged China to take ‘broader action … to 
address the systemic problems’ highlighted in this and other dispute settlement reports.8 We return to 
these related disputes below. 
The question of whether a panel or the Appellate Body should make a recommendation under DSU 
Article 19.1 in relation to an expired, modified, superseded or terminated measure has arisen 
surprisingly frequently in WTO disputes. Moreover, the answer to this question is not clear-cut. In US 
– Certain EC Products, the Appellate Body found that the relevant panel ‘erred in recommending that 
the DSB request the United States to bring into conformity with its WTO obligations a measure which 
the Panel has found no longer exists’.9 Accordingly, in several subsequent disputes, panels have 
declined to make a recommendation under Article 19.1 in respect of measures that have been 
withdrawn or expired.
10
 In one such case, China itself unsuccessfully argued for a recommendation 
under Article 19.1 in respect of certain expired EU anti-dumping measures ‘in order to avoid a 
repetition of the lapsed measures in future’.11 In another, the panel declined China’s request to make a 
                                                     
6
 Panel Report, China – Autos (US), paras. 6.27-6.28. 
7
 DSB, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 18 June 2014, WT/DSB/M/346, 28 August 2014, para. 
6.3. 
8
 Ibid., para. 6.4. 
9
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities (US – 
Certain EC Products), WT/DS165/AB/R, 11 December 2000, para. 81. 
10
 See, e.g., Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS207/R, 3 May 2002, para. 8.3; Panel Report, Turkey – Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice, WT/DS334/R, 
21 September 2007, para. 8.4; Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, WT/DS344/R, 20 December 2007, para. 8.3. 
11
 Panel Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China, WT/DS405/R, 28 October 
2011, para. 8.6. 
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recommendation regarding an expired measure under the second sentence of Article 19.1 ‘that the 
United States does not revert to language similar to that in Section 727 in its future legislation’, 
because the panel found ‘future measures … outside our terms of reference’.12 
Nevertheless, other cases confirm the difficulties that can arise in relation to implementation of an 
adverse ruling where a panel declines to make a recommendation under DSU Article 19.1, and the 
complexity involved in determining whether to make such a recommendation:  
[P]ast panels have ruled on repealed or expired measures if those measures still had lingering 
effects after the repeal or if they thought such a ruling would aid in securing a positive resolution 
to the dispute as required by Article 3.7 of the DSU. Panels have also decided to make rulings on 
repealed or expired measures where the respondent Member had not conceded the WTO 
inconsistency of the measure and the repealed measure could be easily re-imposed.
13
 
Under general international law, in certain situations, a State’s failure to recognise its act as 
internationally wrongful might be seen as a failure to fulfill its obligation ‘[t]o offer appropriate 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.’14 
In some cases, as in China – Autos (US), a panel may consider the evidence before it insufficient to 
conclude that the measure has been terminated.
15
 In others, a qualified recommendation may be made. 
For example, in Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, faced with a request by both 
parties to rule on the WTO-consistency of a measure that had since been modified, the Appellate Body 
recommended that the DSB ‘request the Dominican Republic to bring the tax stamp requirement … 
into conformity with its obligations … if, and to the extent that, the … modifications to the tax stamp 
regime have not already done so’.16 Similarly, in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
the panel recommended that the DSB ‘request the European Communities to bring the general de facto 
moratorium on approvals into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement, if, and to the 
extent that, that measure has not already ceased to exist’.17 
The significance of Article 19.1 recommendations is further complicated in the context of 
compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, which applies ‘where there is disagreement as 
to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings’ of the DSB.18 Compliance proceedings have the advantage of being 
subject to shorter deadlines and ‘wherever possible resort to the original panel’.19 Should China 
reintroduce the measures challenged in China – Autos (US), the United States may be able to bring 
proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU alleging a failure to comply with the Panel’s Article 19.1 
recommendation, which became a recommendation of the DSB upon adoption of the Panel Report. In 
the absence of a recommendation from the Panel under Article 19.1, the United States might be 
regarded as having no DSB recommendation or ruling on which to base a compliance proceeding. On 
the other hand, one panel has suggested that a DSB ruling, as distinct from a recommendation, may 
                                                     
12
 Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, WT/DS392/R, 29 September 
2010, paras. 8.7-8.9 
13
 European Communities and its Member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products (EC – IT 
Products), WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R, 16 August 2010, para. 7.165 (footnotes omitted). 
14
 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) Art 30. 
15
 Panel Report, EC – IT Products, paras. 7.167, 7.1161. 
16
 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes 
(Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/AB/R, 25 April 2005, para. 129. 
17
 Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC – 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006, para. 
8.36. 
18
 Emphasis added. 
19
 DSU Article 21.5. 
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arise simply from a finding in an adopted panel report even if the report includes no recommendation 
under Article 19.1.
20
 
Given these complexities, and notwithstanding the Appellate Body’s decision in US – Certain EC 
Products, panels do have some discretion in deciding whether to make findings and recommendations 
in relation to terminated measures.
21
 The exercise of that discretion may depend on factors such as the 
evidence demonstrating the termination of the measure, the time of termination relative to the 
establishment of the panel
22
 and circulation of the panel report, and any continuing effects of the 
measure despite its termination.  
The utility of panel findings and recommendations concerning measures that are neither in force 
nor continuing to have any effects may be reduced, in part because of the prospective nature of 
remedies in WTO dispute settlement. This forward-looking approach to remedies may be particularly 
problematic in some areas. For example, WTO law allows a member in certain circumstances to 
impose safeguards in the form of quantitative restrictions or increased tariffs on imports of a particular 
product as a temporary measure to address an unexpected flood of imports of that product.
23
 Due to 
their temporary nature, safeguards may well be terminated as a matter of course, having fulfilled their 
objective, by the time a formal challenge to the imposition of safeguards in the WTO dispute 
settlement system is resolved. Effectively, then, the complainant may have no remedy for a WTO-
inconsistent safeguard that has already been removed; conversely, the respondent has enjoyed ‘free’ 
protection for a number of years. 
Even in those circumstances, WTO members may benefit from enhanced clarity about the meaning 
of particular WTO provisions as a result of a panel’s findings and recommendations. In the context of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as in China – Autos (US), the benefits of panel findings and 
recommendations may be more pronounced than in the safeguards context, because anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty measures may otherwise continue for many years, and even the requirement to 
engage in so-called sunset reviews of existing measures does not preclude their continuation (Bown 
and Wauters, 2008).
24
 
III. Related Disputes 
As the United States highlighted at the meeting at which the DSB adopted the Panel Report in China – 
Autos (US), this dispute forms part of a series of disputes in recent years concerning AD and CVD 
measures imposed by China. United States is the complainant in three of these disputes, while Japan 
and the EU have brought additional claims.  
In 2011-2012, in China – GOES, the United States challenged China’s imposition of AD and CVD 
measures imposed by China on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel from the United States (Prusa 
and Vermulst, 2014).
25
 That decision covered several issues common to China – Autos (US) as 
discussed further below, including transparency in the investigation. The Panel found that China acted 
inconsistently with several provisions of the Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements. An appeal by 
                                                     
20
 Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, WT/DS371/R, 15 November 
2010, para. 6.17. 
21
 See Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: 
Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador and the United States, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, 
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, 26 November 2008, para. 270. 
22
 See Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1670. 
23
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) Article XIX:1(a); Agreement on Safeguards Article 7.1. 
24
 ADA Article 11.3; SCM Agreement Article 21.3. 
25
 Panel Report, China – GOES, WT/DS414/R, 15 June 2012. 
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China focused on procedural and substantive aspects of MOFCOM’s findings concerning price 
effects, with the Appellate Body upholding the Panel Report.
26
  
In a subsequent but overlapping dispute that took place from 2011 to 2013, in China – Broiler 
Products, the United States successfully challenged several aspects of the imposition by China of AD 
and CVD measures imposed on broiler products from the United States (Prusa and Vermulst, 2015).
27
 
The complaint again raised some issues addressed in China – GOES as well as some additional issues 
also raised in China – Autos (US) such as the definition of the domestic industry, and a distinct 
substantive issue concerning the cost of production under Article 2.2.1.1 of the ADA. That Panel 
Report was not appealed.  
At around the same time as China – Broiler Products, a panel heard a complaint by the EU against 
China in relation to definitive anti-dumping duties imposed by China on X-ray security inspection 
equipment from the European Union (China – X-Ray Equipment).28 The Panel upheld a number of the 
EU claims, including several procedural and substantive claims raised again in China – Autos (US). 
That decision was not appealed (Moore and Wu, 2015).  
More recently, in 2013, after the Panel in China – Autos (US) had been composed, Japan and the 
EU brought complaints against China in respect of anti-dumping duties imposed on high-performance 
stainless steel seamless tubes (HP-SSST).
29
 The Panel found numerous inconsistencies with the ADA, 
in some instances regarding similar claims to those brought by the United States in China – Autos 
(US). The Panel Reports regarding those complaints were circulated on 13 February 2015 and have not 
yet been adopted at the time of writing. At the DSB meeting on 25 March 2015, Japan, the EU and 
China jointly requested an extension of the time period for adoption or appeal of the Panel Reports in 
these disputes beyond the usual time period of 60 days from circulation of the Panel Reports pursuant 
to Article 16.4 of the DSU, ‘[t]aking into account the current workload of the Appellate Body’. The 
DSB agreed to adopt the reports by 20 May 2015 in the absence of an appeal.
30
 
As China mentioned at the DSB meeting at which the Panel Report in China – Autos (US) was 
adopted, the existence of such a series of disputes is not unprecedented in WTO dispute settlement. 
Indeed, it is a fairly common occurrence. China pointed in particular to the series of cases brought 
against the United States in relation to its so-called zeroing methodology in calculating anti-dumping 
duties (Kolsky Lewis, 2012; Prusa and Vermulst, 2011, Voon, 2007).
31
 As with the zeroing cases, the 
ongoing complaints against China in relation to its AD and CVD investigations and measures raise 
systemic issues in relation to WTO dispute settlement.  
In the WTO, as in public international law more generally,
32
 DSB recommendations and rulings are 
binding only on the parties to the dispute and only in respect of the matters raised in the dispute.
33
 
Thus, strictly speaking, in order to implement an adverse ruling, a respondent such as China or the 
                                                     
26
 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES. 
27
 Panel Report, China – Broiler Products. 
28
 Panel Report, China –X-Ray Equipment.  
29
 Panel Reports, China – Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) from 
Japan and the European Union (China – HP-SSST (Japan); China – HP-SSST (EU)), WT/DS454/R, WT/DS460/R, 13 
February 2015. 
30
 WTO, Panels established at the request of Pakistan, European Union and Korea (News Item, 25 March 2015). 
31
 See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea (US – 
Zeroing (Korea)), WT/DS402/R, 24 February 2011; Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to 
Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, 9 January 2007; Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R, 1 March 2001. 
32
 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice Article 59. 
33
 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 
October 1996, p. 14. 
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United States need modify only the specific measure found non-compliant with its WTO obligations 
and only to the extent necessary to remedy that non-compliance. A provision of a domestic anti-
dumping law that is challenged only ‘as applied’ in a particular instance (e.g., in a particular anti-
dumping investigation) rather than ‘as such’ may therefore continue in force, along with applications 
of the law in new investigations in the manner previously found non-compliant. WTO members will 
need to challenge the new application in order to obtain a remedy for it. Yet at some point a question 
of the respondent’s interpretation and application of WTO obligations in good faith may arise,34 if the 
same measure or practice continues to be successfully challenged in WTO proceedings. This may be 
why the United States eventually in some zeroing disputes took the unusual step of conceding 
substantial aspects of the claims (Huerta-Goldman, 2013).
35
 
The difficulty for complainants in challenging a particular approach, method or procedure falling 
short of an official law or regulation (such as the United States’ “Sunset Policy Bulletin” regarding 
sunset reviews of AD and CVD measures) may be in establishing the existence of an ongoing 
‘measure that … is applied systematically and will continue to be applied in the future’.36 If the WTO-
inconsistency arises simply from the conduct of officials or authorities in particular investigations or 
proceedings, and the respondent refuses to outlaw or introduce broader reforms to address that 
conduct, piecemeal attacks may be necessary, increasing the costs of dispute settlement and 
diminishing the likelihood of a meaningful remedy.  
IV. Procedural Aspects of the MOFCOM Investigations 
In China – Autos (US), the United States successfully challenged several procedural aspects of the 
investigations conducted by MOFCOM. These procedural claims are all common to several other 
disputes brought against China in relation to AD and CVD measures and therefore we do not examine 
them in detail. The primary procedural claims relate to Article 6 (Evidence) of the ADA and also 
cover Article 12 (Evidence) of the SCM Agreement. 
A. Disclosure of Essential Facts 
In relation to Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel stated that  
What constitutes essential facts must … be understood in light of the content of the findings 
needed to satisfy the substantive obligations with respect to the application of definitive measures 
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as the factual circumstances of each case. … [S]uch 
data must relate to the elements set forth in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, including 
the determination of normal value and export price, the determination of constructed normal value 
and constructed export price, if relevant, and the fair comparison between these normal values and 
export prices.
37
 
China and the United States made arguments about the evidence needed to demonstrate whether 
MOFCOM had complied with Article 6.9. China had sent final disclosure letters to the United States 
respondent companies, but the United States did not have copies of those letters, and China declined to 
submit them into evidence.
38
 The parties also disputed whether the Panel could accept ‘as rebuttal 
evidence’ a letter dated 28 April 2011 from Mercedes-Benz USA to MOFCOM, with China 
                                                     
34
 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Articles 26, 31(1). 
35
 See, e.g., Panel Report, US – Zeroing (Korea). 
36
 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WT/DS438/AB/R, WT/DS444/AB/R, 
WT/DS445/AB/R, 15 January 2015, para. 5.139. 
37
 Panel Report, China – Autos (US), para. 7.72. 
38
 Ibid., paras. 7.75, 7.77. 
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maintaining that the letter was not admissible and refusing to rebut it.
39
 The letter stated that 
‘MOFCOM failed to explain in detail how it generated the margins in the final disclosure and did not 
provide the calculation steps, detailed descriptions, formulas and program language, nor did 
MOFCOM describe the relevant calculation process in the final disclosure’.40 The Panel admitted the 
letter into evidence and found that although the letter ‘does not demonstrate, in itself, that the 
disclosure was inconsistent with … Article 6.9, it does lend support to the US claim, and is unrebutted 
by any evidence put forward by China’.41 The Panel therefore found that the United States had made a 
prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 6.9 and in the absence of a rebuttal by China the Panel 
found that China had acted inconsistently with Article 6.9.
42
 
B. Use of ‘Facts Available’ 
In China – Autos (US), the United States challenged MOFCOM’s preliminary and final 
determinations—on the basis of facts available—of the ‘residual’ AD rate (21.5%) for US companies 
that did not register with MOFCOM in the anti-dumping investigation, and a subsidy rate (12.9%) for 
companies that did not register in the CVD investigation.
43
 The United States successfully challenged 
these rates under Article 6.8 (and Annex II(1)) of the ADA and Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, 
and unsuccessfully challenged them under a number of other provisions in connection with disclosure 
and notice to interested parties.
44
  
Essentially, the Panel’s finding of violation under Article 6.8 and Annex II(1) of the ADA was 
based on its assessment that MOFCOM did not request from interested parties in its public notice to 
unknown producers the type of information that MOFCOM ended up using as ‘facts available’, 
namely information in the petition ‘on normal value, export price and possibly certain adjustments’.45 
Rather, the public notice simply requested information about ‘the identity, volume and value of 
exporters of the products’.46 According to the Panel, a ‘disparity between the information requested 
from a producer and the determination ultimately made on the basis of facts available undermines the 
due process rights of the parties concerned’.47  
As regards Article 12.7 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel noted the absence of an equivalent to 
Annex II(1) of the ADA.
48
 The Panel explained, nevertheless, that WTO decisions including the Panel 
Reports in China – GOES and China – Broiler Products demonstrated that ‘the SCM Agreement 
establishes the same general requirements regarding the use of facts available as the ADA, despite the 
lack of an analogue to Annex II.
49
 Adopting the same approach, the Panel found a violation of Article 
12.7 of the SCM Agreement on the basis of the same legal reasoning applied with respect to Article 
6.8 of the ADA.
50
 
                                                     
39
 Ibid., para. 7.79. 
40
 Ibid., para. 7.84. 
41
 Ibid., para. 7.84. 
42
 Ibid., para. 7.84-7.85. 
43
 Ibid., paras. 7.90-7.91, 7.97. 
44
 Ibid., para. 7.120. 
45
 Ibid., para. 7.136. 
46
 Ibid., para. 7.136. 
47
 Ibid., para. 7.136. 
48
 Ibid., para. 7.171. 
49
 Ibid., para. 7.172. 
50
 Ibid., para. 7.173-7.175. 
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V. Substantive Analysis of MOFCOM in Determining Injury 
A WTO member’s determination of injury in an AD or CVD investigation must ‘be based on positive 
evidence’ and must ‘involve an objective examination’ of both (a) the ‘volume’ of dumped or 
subsidized imports and their ‘effect … on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the 
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products’ (ADA Article 3.1; SCM 
Agreement Article 15.1).
51
 The agreements also refer to the domestic producers of the like products as 
the domestic industry.
52
 In China – Autos (US), the Panel assessed the United States’ allegations that 
China breached the WTO requirements in determining injury in relation to three aspects of this 
determination: the definition of the domestic industry; the analysis of price effects; and the analysis of 
causation. We consider these three aspects in turn. 
A. Definition of Domestic Industry 
The ADA and the SCM Agreement contain detailed provisions regarding the definition of domestic 
industry for the purposes of determining the impact of the imported products on that industry. 
Generally,
53
 the domestic industry means ‘the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or … 
those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products’ (ADA Article 4.1; SCM Agreement 16.1). In China – Autos 
(US), the United States contended that MOFCOM’s definition of the domestic industry was 
inconsistent with these provisions (and consequently ADA Article 3.1 and SCM Agreement Article 
15.1) on the basis that MOFCOM’s definition of domestic industry (i) was distorted because it 
excluded producers who declined to participate in the investigation of injury; and (ii) was not based on 
a major proportion of total domestic production. The Panel rejected these claims by the United States. 
According to the Panel, MOFCOM defined its domestic industry on the basis of ‘those producers 
whose output of saloon cars and cross-country cars of a cylinder capacity equal to or greater than 
2500cc constitutes a major proportion of total Chinese production of such automobiles’ (para. 7.211). 
The Panel distinguished this case from EC – Fasteners (China), where the Appellate Body found that 
the investigating authority ‘shrank the universe of producers whose data could have been used for part 
of the injury determination’ ‘by including only those willing to be part of the sample in the domestic 
industry definition’.54 The Panel stated that, unlike the Commission in EC – Fasteners (China), 
MOFCOM did not define the domestic industry on the basis of a subset or sample of participating 
producers but rather included in its definition all relevant producers, subject to the requirement that 
they register their participation within a given deadline (paras. 7.221-7.223). Moreover, ‘MOFCOM 
communicated its notices and forms in an open manner, and the possibility of participation in the 
investigations was equally available to any interested party’ (para. 7.215).  
In relation to the claimed distortion of the domestic industry, the Panel distinguished between the 
definition of the domestic industry and data collection problems that may arise following that 
definition: ‘Provided a registration requirement strikes an appropriate balance between the right of 
interested parties to participate in an investigation, and administrative efficiency, we see nothing in the 
relevant provisions that would preclude it’ (paras. 7.212, 7.214). As the Panel pointed out, this finding 
is consistent with the following conclusion of the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China): 
[I]t was reasonable for the Commission to set a deadline by which producers were required to 
make themselves known. Given the multiple steps that must be carried out in an anti-dumping 
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investigation and the time constraint on an investigation, an investigating authority must be 
allowed to set various deadlines to ensure an orderly conduct of the investigation.
55
 
In relation to the United States’ claim that MOFCOM’s definition of domestic industry was not based 
on a major proportion of total domestic production, the Panel stated that ‘producers in the domestic 
industry accounted for no less than 33.54% of total domestic production during the period examined, 
and as much as 54.16%’, and that the United States had not substantiated its argument that these 
percentages were low or required justification. The Panel also maintained that no hierarchy exists 
between the two bases for defining the domestic industry (total domestic production vs major 
proportion of total domestic production) and that where the major proportion basis is used that 
proportion need not be shown to be representative of total domestic production (paras. 7.229-7.230). 
The Panel in China – Broiler Products made similar findings rejecting the alleged self-selection of 
producers in defining the domestic industry.
56
 While maintaining this claim in China – Autos (US), the 
United States appears to have decided not to pursue other claims about the definition of domestic 
industry that it made in China – Broiler Products, such as that authorities must first attempt to define 
the domestic industry as a whole before turning to the major proportion basis.
57
 Just as respondents 
may be expected to consider broader reform in response to repeated common findings of violation, 
complainants may also decide to abandon arguments that persistently fail. Yet in the absence of a 
direction from the Appellate Body (due to the absence of an appeal) in China – Autos (US) and China 
– Broiler Products, the United States may continue to pursue this claim in future disputes with China 
or other WTO members. 
B. Analysis of Price Effects 
In an injury investigation, in assessing the effect of dumped or subsidized imports on prices, the ADA 
(Article 3.2) and the SCM Agreement (Article 15.2) specify that: 
the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting 
by the … imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or 
whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent 
price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree … 
In China – Autos (US), the Panel rejected the United States’ allegation of breach of these provisions on 
the basis that MOFCOM had improperly defined the domestic industry,
58
 due to its conclusion on that 
issue discussed above.  
In assessing the United States’ other claims regarding MOFCOM’s analysis of price effects, the 
Panel emphasised the requirements of ‘positive evidence’ and an ‘objective examination’ in Article 
3.1 of the ADA and Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement. The Panel also reiterated the Appellate 
Body’s conclusion in China – GOES that investigating authorities must determine whether the 
dumped or subsidized imports have ‘explanatory force’ for the observed effect on domestic prices59 
(that is, authorities must establish a connection between the imports and the price effects).  
The Panel found that China had acted inconsistently with the ADA (Articles 3.1-3.2) and the SCM 
Agreement (Articles 15.1-15.2) in its price effects analysis because: 
a) MOFCOM determined that the prices of the imported products depressed the prices of the Chinese 
domestic like product on the basis of parallel prices of the two products, yet it provided no 
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explanation of: the fact that from 2006 to 2007 the prices of the imported and domestic products 
moved in different directions; the relationship between parallel pricing and price depression of 
domestic industry prices, or; the relationship between the prices and volumes of the imported 
products in affecting domestic prices;
60
 
b) MOFCOM failed to explain its finding of price depression in view of the fact that the imported 
products ‘oversold’ the domestic like product by a significant margin during most of the period of 
investigation (that is, the average price of the imported products was higher than that of the 
domestic like product);
61
 
c) MOFCOM relied on average unit values in its price effects analysis without making adjustments 
to account for differences between the imported and like domestic products, such as a different 
mix of products and some lack of competitive overlap between the products, contrary to the 
general requirement of comparing ‘like with like in comparing prices’,62 and 
d) MOFCOM did not explain why a loss in market share of the domestic industry was necessarily 
linked to a gain in market share of the imported products in view of changes during the period of 
investigation and evidence of the impact on the domestic industry market share of Chinese 
producers outside the domestic industry and third country imports.
63
  
These findings confirm previous panel and Appellate Body rulings identifying the need for authorities 
engaging in an analysis of price effects to ensure price comparability
64
 and also to examine the 
relationship between price effects and the relevant imported products.
65
 While arguably not 
supplanting the causation analysis,
66
 the latter requirement means that some aspects under 
consideration in an analysis of price effects will be similar to those examined in terms of causation. 
C. Analysis of Causation 
In an injury investigation, domestic authorities must also demonstrate that the dumped or subsidized 
‘imports are, through the effects of’ dumping or subsidies respectively, ‘causing injury’ (ADA Article 
3.5; SCM Agreement Article 15.5). These provisions continue, stating that the: 
demonstration of a causal relationship between the … imports and the injury to the domestic 
industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The 
authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the … imports which at the same time 
are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be 
attributed to the … imports …  
The United States challenged China’s causation analysis in China – Autos (US) on several grounds. 
Having found that MOFCOM’s domestic industry definition was consistent with WTO requirements 
but that its price effects analysis was not, the Panel found that the flawed price effects analysis (but not 
the domestic industry definition) also led to a violation of the causation requirements (para. 7.328). 
The panels in China – GOES and China – X-Ray Equipment similarly found that shortcomings in 
MOFCOM’s price effects analysis undermined its causation analysis.67  
                                                     
60
 Ibid., paras. 7.261-7.267. 
61
 Ibid., paras. 7.270-7.275. 
62
 Ibid., paras. 7.277-7.283. 
63
 Ibid., paras. 7.287-7.289, 7.293. 
64
 Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, para. 200; Panel Report, China – Broiler Products, para. 7.479; Panel Report, 
China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.49. 
65
 See, e.g., Panel Report, China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.59. 
66
 See Appellate Body Report, China – GOES, paras. 149-150. 
67
 Panel Report, China – GOES, para. 7.620 (this finding not appealed); China – X-Ray Equipment, para. 7.239.  
China-Autos: Haven’t We Danced This Dance Before? 
11 
While dismissing two of the United States’ other arguments on causation, the Panel also found 
MOFCOM’s causation analysis inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the ADA and Articles 15.1 
and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement because: 
a) despite evidence before MOFCOM that ‘the domestic industry lost market share in 2007 mostly to 
Chinese producers not part of the domestic industry’, MOFCOM’s final determination did not 
discuss the role of those producers in analysing causation;
68
 
b) MOFCOM found that third country imports had no bearing on the causation analysis based on the 
starting and ending figures for third country import market shares in 2006 and 2009 without 
examining the changes in those shares during the period of investigation;
69
 
c) towards the end of the period of investigation, the domestic industry experienced increased labor 
costs, decreased pre-tax profits, and a sharp decline in productivity, yet MOFCOM did not assess 
the impact of the decline in productivity on the state of the domestic industry;
70
 
d) MOFCOM dismissed evidence presented by Chrysler suggesting that ‘domestic and imported US 
automobiles occupied largely different market segments’;71 and 
e) MOFCOM did not address elements such as ‘decreased sales, increased inventories, and possibly 
lower prices’ in determining that the decline in apparent consumption was not relevant to its 
causation analysis.
72
 
In the earlier case of China – X-Ray Equipment, the Panel found similar problems with MOFCOM’s 
analysis of evidence and failure to explain certain conclusions and decisions regarding evidence 
submitted by interested parties. These decisions emphasise the need for MOFCOM and other 
authorities to conduct an analysis of causation that is ‘reasoned and adequate’,73 a phrase derived not 
from provisions of the ADA or the SCM Agreement but from Appellate Body reports.
74
 In turn, the 
requirement of ‘reasoned and adequate’ explanations in AD and CVD investigations appears to be 
derived from Appellate Body interpretations
75
 in disputes arising under the Agreement on Safeguards, 
which does require in Article 3.1 that the ‘competent authorities … publish a report setting forth their 
findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law’.76 
VI. China’s Recurring Issues with Causality and Price Effects 
A. Why Have We Seen Multiple Cases Involving the Same Issues? 
As discussed earlier a number of the same procedural and substantive issues in the China – Autos (US) 
were contested in at least four other recent WTO disputes: China – GOES, China – Broiler Products, 
and China – X-Ray Equipment, and China – HP-SSST. The ongoing complaints against China in 
relation to its AD and CVD investigations and measures raise systemic issues in relation to WTO 
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dispute settlement. While the existence of the same issues in a series of disputes is not unprecedented, 
it does give the impression that China is an obdurate Member. 
There are several possible reasons for this flurry of cases all involving (many of) the same issues. 
One possible explanation is that is that China is guilty of nothing more than being an active AD/CVD 
user who fell short on a set of procedures during a fairly narrow window of time. As evidence consider 
Table 1 where we report key dates in MOFCOM’s original investigations and in the associated WTO 
disputes. Four of the five investigations were initiated before the US even requested a WTO Panel on 
these issues. Moreover, MOFCOM made its final determination in all five investigations before the 
WTO final report had been adopted in any of these disputes. Thus, MOFCOM might argue that it 
simply did not understand what its obligations were until after all five investigations were concluded. 
Now that the WTO has ruled on these issues, MOFCOM will have to revise its procedures. Whether 
MOFCOM revises its procedures in a timely and WTO consistent manner will enlighten us whether 
this benign description holds water. 
A second possible explanation (somewhat related to the first) is that China is a “new” AD user and 
MOFCOM bureaucrats are still learning how to implement its statute in a WTO consistent fashion. 
Like many new developing country users, China needs to learn what is required to satisfy WTO 
requirements and often this learning is of the “learning by doing” variety. Weak analysis of price 
effects and causality characterizes the practice of many developing countries.
77
  
Table 1 – Chinese AD/CVD Investigations with Recurring Issues  
Investigation 
MOFCOM Initiation 
Date 
MOFCOM Final 
Determination 
WTO Panel 
Request Date 
Date Final WTO 
Report Adopted 
China – GOES 
(WT/DS414) 
2009-06-01 2010-04-11 2011-02-11 2012-11-16 
China – Broiler Products 
(WT/DS427) 
2009-09-27 2010-09-07 2011-12-08 2013-09-25 
China – X-Ray 
Equipment (WT/DS425) 
2009-10-23 2011-01-23 2013-04-24 2013-04-24 
China - Autos 
(WT/DS440) 
2009-11-06 2011-12-15 2012-09-17 2014-06-18 
China – HP-SSST 
(WT/DS454, 460)  
2011-09-08 2012-11-09 2013-04-11 N/A 
A challenge to this interpretation is the fact that China reported its first AD investigation in 1998 and 
had initiated more than 170 investigations by 2009. This intensive usage made China was the sixth 
most active AD user over that time period. Given the large number of investigations it might be 
surprising that China had not yet to learn how to do pricing analysis by mid-2009. It is obvious from 
this series of disputes – all involving the same issues – that China had not learned what is expected in 
terms of price effects and causality. If MOFCOM bureaucrats are learning, they are apparently 
learning very, very slowly!  
Given that China is a slow learner it is worth asking why China’s inconsistent practices were not 
challenged in one (or more) of the 170+ AD cases between 1998 and 2009. We believe the answer 
largely lies with the countries targeted by China’s AD protection. In general, (1) most developing 
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countries generally target their AD use toward other developing countries (Bown, 2013; Bown and 
Reynolds, 2015) and (2) developing countries generally do not bring WTO disputes (Bown, 2009).
78
 
These patterns hold true for China. Between 1998 and 2998, China filed about half its cases against its 
Asian competitors (Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) none of whom are aggressive users of the WTO DSU. 
In addition, about 25% of China’s cases were against developing countries. Less than 15% of China’s 
AD cases were against either the EU or US. Further, no country had ever filed a WTO challenge to 
any Chinese AD action prior to China – GOES. Thus, it appears that the most likely explanation for 
why poor procedures existed for 15 years is not that China is learning slowly but rather that China was 
never informed what areas of its AD and CVD methods were WTO inconsistent. 
A third possible explanation is that China has learned from the recalcitrance of other WTO 
members in bringing their WTO inconsistent policies into compliance. Ironically, the US is arguably 
the leading offender of this type of foot dragging. The US’ Foreign Sales Corporation was the subject 
of various WTO disputes from 1999 through 2004. Similarly, the US took six years after the initial 
WTO finding to repeal the Anti-dumping Act of 1916. Of course, the delays in bringing these policies 
into compliance pale in comparison to the US’ stubbornness with respect to zeroing. After more than a 
decade and more than 30 adverse WTO rulings the US continues to zero (Bown and Prusa, 2011). If 
China follows this model of delaying implementation then we can expect many more WTO disputes 
involving similar issues. 
B. Shortcomings with MOFCOM’s Price Effects and Causation Analysis 
The ADA specifies that that the investigating authority examine the volume of dumped imports, their 
effect on domestic prices and the consequent impact of the imports on domestic producers. With 
respect to price effects, the ADA expects the investigating authority to consider whether there has 
been significant price undercutting or price depression or suppression. The investigating authority 
must also evaluate the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry by examining all relevant 
economic factors, including factors of domestic origin (e.g., factory shutdowns, rising wages, etc.) and 
those whose origin are in subject and non-subject markets.  
From what we can ascertain from the Report, MOFCOM’s analysis falls short of what is required 
by the WTO and hence that the Panel’s conclusions are correct. While many of the details about 
MOFCOM’s exact analysis are not reported, the Panel Report does provide a summary of several 
aspects of MOFCOM’s approach and a number of glaring deficiencies were noted.  
By way of background, we note that the price effects and causality analysis under the ADA falls 
well below what economists believe is sufficient to draw conclusions with a high degree of 
confidence. In the EU and US, for instance, trends and correlations are generally what pass for 
economic analysis. By contrast, economists would argue that each aspect of the price effects and 
causality analysis should consider the multitude of contributing factors that are all changing at the 
same time. It is clear, however, that economics perspective on analytical requirements go well beyond 
what the WTO currently requires for AD and CVD determinations.  
One serious deficiency involves the product definition used in the analysis. MOFCOM based its 
pricing analysis on an overly broad product definition. In general, even though an investigation might 
involve a single “product” (e.g., automobiles) the investigative authority will often base its pricing 
analysis on a finer product definition. For example, MOFCOM could have requested data on four or 
five different classifications of automobiles, say, defined by engine size or vehicle weight. This would 
have allowed the agency to do an “apples to apples” comparison rather than simply combining all 
types and sizes of automobiles together into a single price index. The issue of properly defining the 
product for purpose of price effects is sometimes called “price comparability” and is something fairly 
easily for MOFCOM to incorporate into its procedures. If, for example, subject imports were 
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composed mostly of large cars and domestic production is mostly small cars one would not be 
surprised to find a single automobile price index a very poor instrument for determining price effects. 
It would be much better, for example, if MOFCOM compared subject and domestic trends for small 
cars and large cars separately. In this investigation, the Panel reports that MOFCOM knew the product 
mix differed across domestic and import suppliers and MOFCOM also acknowledged a lack of 
competitive overlap across these product segments. Nevertheless, MOFCOM failed to do a finer price 
comparison. It is impossible to imagine how MOFCOM could have expected its approach to pass 
muster. 
Further muddying the analysis was the fact that MOFCOM did not collect its price information in a 
consistent time period basis. Said differently, the EU and US generally collect on a quarterly basis 
prices (often at a narrowly defined product level). MOFCOM mixed annual price data with some 
quarterly data which makes inference essentially impossible. We cannot conceive of how causality can 
be established when the authority simply compares one annual price with a second annual price. 
Assuming China had collected data using a proper product definition and on a monthly or quarterly 
basis, even then MOFCOM’s trends analysis was problematic. Trends analysis is commonly used by 
investigating authorities in many jurisdictions. Figure 1 depicts what a trends analysis chart might look 
like. In the figure we plot quarterly hypothetical import and domestic price trends for a product under 
investigation. The investigating authority would likely note that subject import prices are lower than 
competing domestic prices and that the subject import prices appear to be leading the domestic prices. 
Formal statistical analysis does not have to be done but the investigative agency does perform some 
type of quantitative analysis to justify its finding of price effects and causality and a “factor by factor” 
graphical analysis of this sort is not uncommon. 
Figure 1 – An Example of Simple Trend Analysis 
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By contrast, MOFCOM’s analysis fell short of even the relatively informal analysis depicted in Figure 
1 on a number of grounds. First, MOFCOM did not properly account for the differences in the level 
and movement of subject import and domestic prices. In particular, for a significant part of the period 
of investigation subject import prices and domestic prices were moving in opposite directions (i.e., 
rather than being positively correlated they were negatively correlated). Figure 2 depicts what such a 
non-obvious trend might look like. This unexpected difference in price trends, by itself, does not mean 
MOFCOM could not have found price effects, but MOFCOM did not provide any explanation for how 
it explained the negative correlation. Ironically, the negative correlation may have easily been caused 
by a changing mix of products over the period but because MOFCOM did not collect sufficiently 
disaggregated data it could not determine if this was a factor. Moreover, the fact that for much of the 
period subject import prices were higher than domestic prices could have also been due to product mix 
issues. 
Figure 2 – Non-Obvious Trend Analysis 
 
MOFCOM also failed to account for, and explain the impact of, non-subject imports. Because formal 
statistical methods are eschewed by most investigative authorities the role of non-subject imports is a 
serious issue for many investigative authorities, not just China. But, in this investigation MOFCOM 
essentially disregarded the potential role played by non-subject imports. This is this is particularly a 
problem in this investigation because non-subject imports were not only much, much larger than 
subject supply but grew much faster during the period (see Table 2). Germany’s share grew from 14% 
to 45% over the period and Japan’s share grew from 10% to 16%. By contrast, subject imports grew 
from 2% to 8%. The failure to discuss the difference in the causes for and effects of the changing 
fortunes of the various foreign suppliers allowed the US to successfully make a compelling non-
attribution claim. 
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Table 2 – Share of China Import Market (Passenger Cars) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Germany 14% 42% 45% 49% 0% 43% 0% 
Japan 10% 20% 16% 13% 29% 11% 26% 
USA 2% 5% 8% 9% 29% 15% 39% 
Source: HS codes from Bown (2014). Trade data from “UN Comtrade Database,” available at 
http://comtrade.un.org/data/.  
Finally, we note that MOFCOM failed to discuss the role of domestic factors that could have affected 
industry profitability. In particular, the US pointed to a 33% increase in labor costs (due to a large 
decrease in labor productivity) that was not discussed in MOFCOM’s determination. 
It is our opinion that correcting most of these deficiencies is not an insurmountable task for 
MOFCOM. While improving its data collection approach will require change in approach, most of the 
other problems are issues that MOFCOM can likely address by improving its written determinations 
and explaining (i) that it considered these factors and (ii) how its conclusions were drawn.  
VII. Concluding Comments 
In light of the previous Panel and AB decisions on similar procedural and substantive issues in at least 
four other recent WTO disputes we do not believe any of the findings in this dispute are surprising or 
establish an important new WTO Panel/AB view on the issues. To put it bluntly, this is a rather 
pedestrian dispute. In fact, most of the related disputes contained other issues which were of 
potentially greater consequence than the procedural and substantive issues in China – Autos (US), e.g., 
the cost allocation issue in China – Broiler Products or the strategic trade policy aspects of China – X-
Ray Equipment. In this sense this dispute is more akin to a number of the recent zeroing disputes 
where the WTO was largely confirming the same inconsistent policies and procedures were still in 
place. 
One aspect of this case that is worth noting is that case, much like China – Broiler Products, is a 
striking example of tit-for-tat trade policy. A timeline of key events is given in Table 3. After six 
months of deliberation, in September 2009 the US imposed China safeguard duties on passenger 
vehicle and light truck tires from China. China initiated its investigation into US chicken parts just 10 
days later and its investigation into US automobiles about five weeks later.  
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Table 3 – Tit for Tat Trade Policies 
Date Action 
2009-04 US Initiates China Safeguard Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China 
2009-07 USITC sends Final Report on China Safeguard Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck 
Tires from China to President 
2009-08 Public Rumours of China AD/CVD Cases Being Prepared 
2009-09 US President Imposes Tariffs on Passenger Tires from China 
2009-09 China Initiates AD/CVD Case on Broiler Products on Chicken Products from US 
2009-11 China Initiates AD/CVD Case on Autos from US 
2010-09 China Imposes AD/CVD Duties on Broiler Parts from US 
2011-12 US Requests WTO Panel (Broiler Parts) 
2012-01 China Imposes AD/CVD Duties Imposed on Autos from US 
2012-09 US Requests WTO Panel (Autos) 
2013-08 
2013-09 
WTO Panel Report (Broiler Parts) Circulated & Adopted 
2013-12 China – AD/CVD Duties on Autos Revoked 
2014-05 
2014-06 
WTO Panel Report (Autos) Circulated & Adopted 
This timing is no coincidence. The prospect of Chinese AD investigations on US chicken parts and 
automobile exports were rumored in advance of the US’ safeguard decision. The products with which 
China chose to retaliate could not be more different. The US exported more than $700 million of 
chicken broilers and parts (primarily chicken paws) to China in 2008 and 2009. The US was easily 
China’s largest supplier of chicken parts. 
While the US exported a similar dollar value of automobiles in 2008 and 2009, it was not the 
largest auto supplier to China. As shown in Table 2 the US accounted for about 2% of auto imports in 
2008. What is remarkable is the tremendous increase in US auto exports that occurred even though 
AD/CVD duties were in place. The US exported about $700 million in autos in 2007; by 2010 US auto 
exports to China had increased to $3.3 billion and by 2013 to $8.5 billion.  
Thus, it is our opinion that China AD/CVD duties on US Autos were not about imposing huge 
dollar losses on the US (as was the case in chicken parts), but rather about saber rattling – sending a 
signal about what important industries of the future could be subject to discretionary protection. The 
fact that China revoked the tariffs before the WTO Panel had even made its report further supports this 
view.  
From a broader perspective, the ability for China to use a potentially WTO consistent measure such 
as AD and CVD for a short period of time (i.e., two to three years) and then repeal the orders with 
little to no cost poses a serious problem for the WTO system. By design WTO DSU relief is 
prospective. This means even if a WTO Panel rules that China must remove its duties China will have 
gained in the short run (at least politically) – either by punishing a trading partner it is unhappy with or 
by satisfying the demands of an important domestic industry. The prospective nature of WTO relief 
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makes it almost impossible for the WTO to discourage the type of opportunistic protectionist actions 
exemplified by this dispute. It may be well be that China is the one responding to politically motivated 
WTO-inconsistent trade policies (e.g., US tariffs on Chinese automobile tires), nevertheless, the lack 
of retrospective relief makes “short run” cheating inevitable. Given the pedestrian nature of the 
specific policies being challenged we believe the legacy of this dispute will not involve the dispute 
specifics but rather it serving as a clear example of tit-for-tat trade policy.  
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